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This theoretical article makes a contribution to the field of “psychoanalytically informed
neuroscience”. First, central characteristics of psychoanalysis and neuroscience are briefly
described leading into three epistemic dichotomies. Neuroscience versus psychoanalysis
display almost opposing methodological approaches (reduction vs. expansion), test quality
emphases (reliability vs. validity) and meaning of results (correlation vs. explanation).
The critical point is to reach an intermediate level: in neuroscience an adequate
position integrating both aspects—objective and subjective—of dual-aspect monism,
and in psychoanalysis the appropriate level for the scientific investigation of its central
concepts. As a suggestion to reach that level in both fields the system of Operationalized
Psychodynamic Diagnosis (OPD; OPD Task Force, 2008) is presented. Combining aspects
of both fields areas, expansion and reduction as well as reliability and validity, OPD could
be a fruitful tool to transfer psychodynamic constructs into neuroscience. The article
closes with a short description of recent applications of OPD in neuroscience.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite many efforts to bring psychoanalysis and neuroscience
together, we propose that there exists a profound gap between the
two approaches. Hence, the intention of this theoretical article
is, first, to describe those core differences and provide possible
explanations for them and, second, to present the system of Oper-
ationalized Psychodynamic Diagnosis (OPD; OPD Task Force,
2008) as an instrument to bridge both sides. Although there exists
a long (and eventful) relationship between psychoanalysis and
different forms of neurosciences, the term “neuropsychoanalysis”
itself was only coined in 1999 with the title of the respective
journal. In an attempt to bring psychoanalysis and neuroscience
together, pioneers in the field, Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull,
describe two scientific areas that fall under their broad conception
of neuropsychoanalysis (Solms and Turnbull, 2011). First, they
refer to the direct psychoanalytic investigation of neurological
phenomena. This was the starting point of their work in the
field using mainly patients with focal brain damage (Kaplan-
Solms and Solms, 2000). Second, they also include psychoanalyt-
ically informed neuroscience, where hypotheses derived broadly
from psychoanalysis are tested with neuroscientific methods. It
is only the second aspect of neuropsychoanalysis that will be
the subject of this article. On the theoretical and empirical side,
many endeavors bringing both fields together could be observed
which were mainly propelled by methodological and conceptual
progresses achieved in neuroscience. Those endeavors are covered
in the review by Sauvagnat and colleagues (Sauvagnat et al.,
2010). Looking at institutions and structures, the founding of the
“International Neuropsychoanalysis Society” and its respective
journal Neuropsychoanalysis was a major step towards “building
bridges between psychoanalysis, neuroscience, psychology and
psychiatry” (full header on the society’s website). Importantly,
the society members and editorial staff of the journal include
prominent scientists from both fields. This special issue on neu-
ropsychoanalysis in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience is another
venture assisting the “genuine dialogue between biology and
psychoanalysis” (Kandel, 1999).
So far, there seem to be co-operations and exchanges between
the two fields. Nevertheless, we still notice a strong reductionism
in neuroscience and,more importantly, biological psychiatry. Psy-
choanalytic concepts seem to be virtually absent in major publi-
cations reporting empirical contributions in biological psychiatry.
It is important, at this point, to introduce the differentiation
between methodological and ontological reductionism. Only the
latter, the idea that mental disorders are merely wrongly wired
neurons or imbalances in certain transmitters and that it is of
no relevance to consider psychological aspects (ontological reduc-
tionism) is questioned here. Themethodological reductionism is a
necessary prerequisite of neuroscience, stressing the importance
to reduce complex phenomena into components that can be
studied with neuroscientific methods. This form of reductionism
is further described in the next section and actually forms one
aspect where both, neuroscience and psychoanalysis, could be
connected. On the psychoanalytical side there are still articles
questioning the value of neuroscience to psychoanalysis in prin-
ciple (Blass and Carmeli, 2007). Harder to capture within the
scope of a scientific article though, but an important part of our
reality, is the fact that there are psychoanalysts questioning the
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approaches, methods and results of existing neuropsychoanalytic
empirical work in seminars and discussion forums. There seems
to be a profound scepticism towards attempts to bridge the two
areas.
Our critical point is that the gap is not merely a problem
of different scientific languages. From our point of view, the
differences between neuroscience and psychoanalysis go deeper
and can be dichotomized into almost opposing methodologi-
cal approaches (reduction vs. expansion), test quality emphases
(reliability vs. validity) and meaning of results (correlation vs.
explanation). This will be embellished in the next section. Two
intersections follow that are concerned with the problem to reach
an intermediate level in both, psychoanalysis and neuroscience.
Afterwards, OPD as a system will be presented, and the last
section explains how OPD could help to transfer psychodynamic
constructs into neuroscience, propelling empirical research in the
field that Solms and Turnbull (2011) named “psychoanalytically
informed neuroscience”.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND NEUROSCIENCE
When considering differences between psychoanalysis and
neuroscience one has to be aware of the divergent aims of
both approaches. Whereas psychoanalysis was developed as
a genuinely therapeutical technique to help the individual
patient regain mental health, neuroscience wants to uncover the
neural foundations of mental processes on an experimentally
controlled level intentionally abstracting from the individual.
From those divergent aims, different characteristics can easily be
derived.
In psychoanalysis, the starting point is a clinical problem, i.e.,
a patient seeking for help from the psychoanalyst because he or
she suffers from some form of mental disorder. To better under-
stand the patient, the psychoanalyst eventually gathers informa-
tion “surrounding” the problem: biographical background, recent
circumstances of living and at work, situations triggering the
problem, interpersonal relations, wishes, hopes, fears, complaints,
dreams, and many more. That information is obtained by listen-
ing to the patient with “evenly suspended attention” (Freud, 1914)
and sometimes asking direct questions. In other words: the initial
clinical problem (“I feel depressed”) is expanded into various
branches of the patient’s life and environment, in width and
depth, to obtain a more comprehensive picture. All of this time-
consuming process has the goal to, plainly spoken, “find out what
really bothers the patient”. That is, what are the factors that cause
and eventually maintain the patient’s clinical problem? Those
factors could be idiosyncratic ways of interpersonal relations,
certain psychodynamic conflicts or structural deficits. All of those
factors are mainly rooted in the patient’s biographical experiences
(Person et al., 2005), the emotional and behavioral reactions
towards those experiences, and finally the mental representation
of this idiosyncratic experience and behavior. In psychoanalysis
the idea of psychic determinism (Brenner, 1974) is of central
importance: the above mentioned factors are believed to play a
genuinely causal role in the development of the individual prob-
lem. This leads to two epistemic consequences. First, gathering
information and factors can only be fruitful, if it deals with themes
that actually apply to the individual, that are “truly his issues”.
Hence, on the level of test quality (although a psychoanalyst
would hardly use the term regarding his practice), validity is
of key importance. Second, causal inferences from psychological
factors to clinical problems allow for an explanation of the latter.
Dysfunctional relationship patterns with the parents could, for
instance, explain the patient’s problems in recent relationships
leading to social isolation and depressed mood. Expansion, valid-
ity and explanation are thus three epistemic hallmarks in the
practice of psychoanalysis.
As for neuroscience, the need for experimental control
and abstraction from the individual call for almost opposing
characteristics. When designing an experiment dealing with a
certain psychological process, the inherent complexity of that
very process has to be strictly controlled in order to achieve
any meaningful results at all. One typical way of control is
the reduction of a complex process into simpler components,
which themselves are subject to the empirical investigation. Only
relatively simple (sub-) components can be varied systematically
in order to find regularities and differences in their characteristics.
Furthermore, systematic experiments should be replicable.
Investigating group effects for a certain psychological process and
abstracting from individuals, different labs should principally
obtain the same results using the same experiment. Hence,
reliability is the central issue from a test quality perspective.
Finally, due to well-investigated methodological constraints
(e.g. Logothetis, 2008), results obtained with the most common
neuroscientific methods (e.g., neuroimaging) reflect merely
psycho-physiological co-activation. That is, the activity of certain
brain areas that timely co-occurs with an observed psychological
process is typically interpreted as the neural correlate of this very
process. Thanks to the caution of serious neuroscientists, causality
would not be inferred from this activity. Consequently, though,
the measured brain activity cannot explain the psychological
process. Reduction, reliability and correlation are hence the
neuroscience counterparts of the above mentioned aspects in
psychoanalysis.
INTERSECTION I: REACHING THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL
IN NEUROSCIENCE
We dichotomized psychoanalysis and neuroscience in the pre-
vious section, but in fact profound differences in perspective
exist even within each area. This shall be outlined briefly. As
for neuroscience (and adjacent disciplines), a core—and very
old—problem remains the question how brain and mind relate,
that is, how can we bring together two entities that are appar-
ently so different. Many endeavors in philosophy, psychology
and other disciplines have been made to tackle this issue, but
in the growing field of neuropsychoanalysis a position prevails
that can be described as dual-aspect monism or perspectivism
(see Solms, 1997 and Solms and Turnbull, 2002 for a detailed
description and an overview of the debate). The central idea is
that mind and brain are the same (monism), but we perceive
them from two different perspectives (dual-aspect). As neurosci-
entists we focus on the physiological and anatomical aspect of
the mind/brain from an “objective” perspective, and as human
beings we perceive it from the inside in a “subjective” way.
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Regardless of how we see it, mind/brain remains one entity.
Sigmund Freud also adopted this “intermediate” position and
provided us with the technique of free association as a means
to explore the inner, subjective, aspect of mind/brain. The two
premises of dual-aspect monism—mind and brain are one that
we can perceive from two perspectives—actually form the very
foundation of the neuropsychoanalytic venture. The “monism”
part is implicitly included when researchers like Eric Kandel state
in an influential article bridging psychiatry and biology: “Insofar
as our words produce changes in our patient’s mind, it is likely
that these psychotherapeutic interventions produce changes in
the patient’s brain” (Kandel, 1998, p. 466). In this article, Kandel
understands interactions between brain, mind and behavior on
a broad level: behavior and social factors exert actions on the
brain by feeding back upon it to modify gene-expression and
thus nervous functioning. It is hence the belief that psychosocial
experiences actually have an impact on the physical brain, that
relationship patterns leave their traces in neural networks that
fuels the research in neuropsychoanalysis. The true art is, of
course, to reach that intermediate level in neuroscience where
both perspectives—the objective and subjective—can best be
integrated. The application of OPD in neuroscientific research
(see last section) is an attempt to reach that level.
INTERSECTION II: REACHING THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL
IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
Psychoanalysis itself is facing the difficulty to reach an inter-
mediate level appropriate for the scientific investigation of its
central concepts. Hence, a brief introduction into the problem of
operationalization in psychoanalysis is provided before describing
the system of OPD itself.
Attempts to operationalize psychoanalytic concepts are
inevitably encountered with challenging difficulties. The central
task of the operationalization of a construct must be to establish
a link between the levels of theory and observation. Research
operationalizations are primarily geared towards the logic of
experimental design, and in this way substantially influence the
translation of the original theoretical term into an operational
term. For this, it is necessary to explicate and specify the relevant
constructs in order for them to be translated into research
operations. This step is difficult in psychoanalysis with its
complex constructs like the unconscious, processes of repression,
affects, or transferences which are not directly observable but
must be inferred from their “derivatives”. Therefore endeavors
of operationalization of psychoanalytic concepts must reach
an intermediate level, which may allow a gain in clarity and
unequivocalness, without at the same time removing the concept
too far away from its dynamic content. To emphasize, the goal
of such a procedure would be to gain as much freedom from
contradiction as possible while preserving as much dynamic
content as possible.
OPERATIONALIZED PSYCHODYNAMIC DIAGNOSIS (OPD)
As for the “standard” assessment of mental disorders the “Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual” (DSM-IV) of the American Psychi-
atric Association (APA, 1994) and the “International Classifica-
tion of Mental and Behavioral Disorders” (ICD-10) of the World
Health Organization (WHO, 1992) have attained wide usage. Psy-
chodynamic psychotherapists (and others) regret, however, the
lack of relevance of the phenomenological and symptom-centered
diagnoses of ICD and DSM when seeking possible explanations
of clinical problems. On the other side, there was a growing
dissatisfaction with the divergence of psychoanalytic theory: dif-
ferent groups vary in terminology and develop their own (sub-)
concepts, rendering communication between therapists difficult.
Those two problems were the starting point for the creation
of the OPD Task Force in 1990 in Germany. The goal was to
broaden the ICD and DSM classifications to include fundamental
psychodynamic dimensions, and at the same time to remain
aspects of reliability and terminological precision apparent in ICD
and DSM. In reference to the previous section, OPD is an attempt
to reach the intermediate level.
The OPD system is based on four psychodynamically relevant
diagnostic axes with appropriate categories to complement ICD
classification (fifth axis): axis I (experience of illness and prereq-
uisites for treatment), axis II (interpersonal relations), axis III
(psychodynamic conflicts), axis IV (psychological structure) and
axis V (syndromal diagnosis according to ICD-10).
In practice, for a 1–2 h patient examination, which is still
an open psychodynamic interview in nature, OPD provides flex-
ible interview guidelines to ensure the relevant information is
obtained. Details can be found in the recent OPD manual (OPD
Task Force, 2008). The three axes most relevant for the psychody-
namic approach will be described briefly.
As for axis II (interpersonal relations), mental disorders are
conceived as “relationship disorders”. In almost all schools of
psychotherapy, automated and maladaptive interpersonal behav-
ior patterns are considered to be an essential factor influencing
mental disorders. Along with symptomatic complaints, problems
relating to interaction with others are often the most important
factor to be addressed at the outset of psychotherapy. With
time, through the “depositing” of relational experiences, mental
representations develop alongside the life story, and these are
confirmed or modified by our experiences in interpersonal rela-
tionships with others (Anchin and Kiesler, 1982). The basic struc-
ture of the OPD relationship axis depicts the circular or transac-
tional character of human interaction (interchange of subjective
experience and response to the environment). A framework was
developed which encapsulates subjective experience concerning
self and others on the initial level. On a second level it is possible
to represent the experience of this other person (significant other,
interviewer): how is the patient experienced by his objects or the
interviewer and which impulses does he generate in them? Items
of the OPD relationship axis help to define the variety of behaviors
seen in relationships.
Axis III assesses psychodynamic conflicts searching for com-
mon motives in central life areas such as relationship to part-
ner, family of origin, profession, ownership, behavior in groups
and illness experience. OPD distinguishes the following seven
conflicts: (1) Dependence versus autonomy; (2) Submission ver-
sus control; (3) Desire for care vs. autarchy; (4) Conflicts of
self-value; (5) Guilt conflicts; (6) Oedipal conflicts; (7) Identity
conflicts. Those conflicts are operationalized thoroughly in the
manual, providing a terminologically clear description of the con-
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flict characteristics, its typical core affect, transference, counter-
transference and implications for various aspects of the patient’s
life.
Finally, the fourth axis is concerned with the psychologi-
cal structure of the patient. OPD differentiates four levels of
structure (good integrated, moderately integrated, low integrated,
disintegrated). Good integration means that an autonomous self
possesses a mental internal space in which mental conflicts can
be carried out. Moderate integration implies lower availabil-
ity of regulating function and a weaker differentiation of men-
tal substructures. With low integration the mental inner space
and substructures are less developed, thus conflicts are barely
mentally worked out, but are mainly worked out in the inter-
personal sphere. Disintegration is characterized by fragmenta-
tion and psychotic restitution of the structure. Operationaliza-
tion of structure is based on four structural dimensions with a
self-related and an object-related subdomain each: (1) Percep-
tion; (2) Regulation; (3) Communication; (4) Bonding. Again,
those structural levels are operationalized extensively with clear
descriptions and patient examples to illustrate specific structural
deficits.
Concluding this section, OPD combines the best of both
approaches: the inclusion of an expanded view apparent in psy-
choanalysis and the systematic reduction helpful in all exper-
imental sciences (e.g. neuroscience). Due to the consideration
of psychoanalytical constructs that are well-grounded in clin-
ical experience, validity of the OPD is sufficient, and because
of the systematic operationalization of assessment, reliability is
constantly high in empirical investigations (Cierpka et al., 2007).
THE TRANSFER OF PSYCHODYNAMIC CONSTRUCTS
INTO NEUROSCIENCE
As a starting point, we do believe that psychoanalysis and neu-
roscience could substantially benefit from each other in the field
of “psychoanalytically informed neuroscience” (Solms and Turn-
bull, 2011). The key question regards an adequate methodological
approach to bring the two together. Being the main message
of this article, we want to propose OPD as an instrument to
transfer psychodynamic constructs into neuroscience. Advanced
neuroscience methods offer superior experimental control and
fine-grained analyses of brain activation and connectivity. This
rigorous method is the bottom line for any scientific investigation
of complex mental phenomena. To avoid the shortcomings of
reductionism, that necessarily come with experimental control,
an expansive tapping into real-world complexity should be tried,
however. One important way to achieve this is via individualiza-
tion of experiments, as has been proposed before (Kessler et al.,
2011b). Only if the experiment touches the mentally represented
themes that are of individual relevance to each subject, results
could have validity and meaning in a deeper sense. But how can
we gather individualized information in a systematic way that is
compatible with experimental control? This is where OPD offers
the system and practical tools for the task at hand. First, real-life
complexity of actual patients is reduced into simpler components
in a methodologically rigorous and transparent way as reflected
in the axes and the differentiation between items within a given
axis. The good operationalization of the OPD manual fosters
reliability, and the richness (expansion) of the material obtained
in an individual interview provides the basis for validity. Second,
the components assessed with OPD can be translated into experi-
mental stimuli with relative ease (see below). Brain reactions to
those stimuli could be interpreted on a better foundation due
to the individual and valid nature of the stimuli. This clinically-
grounded explanation of brain activity must not, however, be
confused with causality in a strict sense. Since there are always
alternative directions to consider brain activity (see Lewis, 2000
and Kessler et al., 2011b for details) the quest for causality has to
remain an open issue.
In the remainder of this section we want to give recent exam-
ples of how OPD is used in neuroscience. With space constraints
and the focus of this article on the theoretical aspects, this part
is kept short and serves mainly for illustratory purposes. Details
can be found in the respective publications. The first study in
this vein investigated patients with chronic depressionundergoing
psychoanalysis (Kessler et al., 2011a). An OPD interview was con-
ducted with each patient to extract his or her major dysfunctional
repetitive relation leading to depression or maintaining it. This
pattern was translated into four essential sentences presented in
the fMRI scanner (block design, 30 s for all four sentences).
An example set would be: “You wish to be accepted by others.
Therefore you do a lot for them. That is often too close for
them, so they retreat. Then you feel empty and lonely”. Patients
exhibited relatively strong activation in limbic and subcortical
areas (e.g., amygdala, basal ganglia) reflecting possible emotion
processing. The critical issue here is that brain responses to
those stimuli can be interpreted on a clinical ground due to
the individualized nature of the stimuli. In another study, OPD
was used to derive sentences that capture the essence of typical
psychodynamic conflicts (Schmeing et al., 2013). Those sentences
served as stimuli in an fMRI experiment investigating free associ-
ations to potentially conflictual situations in healthy participants.
Two types of conflict were used for the generation of “OPD”
sentences: autonomy/dependency (e.g., “I cannot say “No” if
someone else is asking me for help”), and self-esteem–conflict
(e.g., “I often estimate myself as little competent”). Again, with
the stimuli themselves being rooted in OPD, brain activity during
free association to those sentences could have a psychodynamic
“meaning”. Finally, in a recent study from our lab fMRI data is
collected during free association to emotionally relevant sentences
and analyzed using an OPD-based separation of subjects into two
groups: (1) individuals with the association reflecting a possible
psychodynamic conflict; (2) individuals who did not show any
sign of conflict in their associations (Kehyayan et al., 2013). To this
end, subjects’ associations were compared with the typical man-
ifestations of the respective psychodynamic conflicts described
thoroughly in the OPD manual (partnership, family, profession,
etc.). The aim was to detect associations that point to probable
psychodynamic conflicts regarding the theme of the stimulus
sentence. OPD is thus used post-hoc to provide a psychodynamic
interpretation of brain activity.
CONCLUSION
In the face of profound differences between psychoanalysis and
neuroscience, the critical point is to reach an intermediate level.
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That is, an adequate position to integrate the subjective and
objective aspect of dual-aspect monism and the appropriate level
to systematically investigate concepts of psychoanalysis. In this
vein, the best aspects of both approaches have to be included
(e.g., systematic reduction and at the same time clinically relevant
expansion or reliability maintaining validity). OPD is presented
as such an approach to reach that level by transferring psychody-
namic constructs into neuroscience.
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